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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA. By William Burnett Harvey.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1966. Pp. xiii, 453. $10.

In January 1963 an event of national significance was celebrated
in Accra, the capital city of Ghana: the inauguration by the President
of the Republic, Doctor Kwame Nkrumah, of the handsome new
building of the national law school. The neatly printed program
admonished the several hundred invited guests, Ghanaian and
foreign, to be in their seats fifteen minutes prior to the arrival of the
Os~igyefo, the Saviour of the People of Ghana. Punctually, three
minutes before the appointed time, the assembled guests heard the
rhythmic shouts of the crowd outside coming ever closer to the new
building: "Os igyefo, Osdgyefo, OSAGYEFO." Then trumpets and
fanfares and the entry of the leader and his entourage, greeted by enthusiastic shouts of "Os~igyefo." With measured steps did he ascend
the dais to deliver a major address on the role of law in the new
Ghana. It would have the task of nation-building and of constructing
socialism; never ought mere formalities of procedure be allowed to
stand in the way of reaching these great goals. Always would the law
have to provide the instrument to deal effectively with the enemies
of progress. New fanfares-Exit the Saviour. Reminiscences were
conjured up of the Duce's Italy, the Fiihrer's Germany.
It was but natural that the Osigyefo's ideas about law were to
clash with those of the man whom he called to head the faculty of
law of Ghana's university, Dean William Burnett Harvey, the
author of the book under review. Nkrumah could not bear that the
lawyers of his country be educated by a man whose ideas of law
were those of Anglo-American tradition. After just about two years
of constructive work at Legon, Dean Harvey was ordered to be
deported.
Harvey's book is a fruit of his Ghanaian venture. He describes in
detail the transformation of the legal system of Ghana: the hesitant,
although important, measures of the British colonial administration;
the acceleration of the transitional stage of emerging self-government
(1946-1957); and the radical changes of the independent state of
Ghana, first, as a member nation of the Commonwealth (1957-1964)
and then as the new Republic of Ghana. The lawyer's narrative
reflects the transformation of the social structure of the country. In
fact, it constitutes a new history of the ways in which law is used
as a tool to establish an authoritarian regime determined to transform in haste a backward country into a modem nation.
In the first three chapters, Harvey describes the legal measures
by which the colony of the Gold Coast was established, by which it
was transformed into the Commonwealth country of Ghana, and by
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which that new nation was turned from a British-type democracy
into a republic of one-party rule under the domination of a single
man.
When in the late nineteenth century the British entered the
Gold Coast and gradually extended their rule northward, they sought
to preserve the traditional authorities and to integrate them into
their own system of government. As in India, Nigeria, and other
regions, pacification and administration were to be achieved through
"indirect rule." Under the guidance and control of a small number
of British administrators, the current tasks of government were to
be carried out by native chiefs and councils.
In the Gold Coast, different systems of native rule were found in
the North than were found among the Akan people of the South.
The Northern system was simple: secular rule over the numerous
small tribes and lineages was exercised by local chiefs; religious functions were performed by priests. Among the Akan people, however,
the warlike Ashanti had established a complex system in which the
local states and lineages had been forged into a large federation-like
unit. The paramount ruler, the Ashantehene, as well as the subchiefs, combined secular power with the religious function of mediating between the living and the ancestors. Indeed, secular power
rested essentially upon the belief in the charisma of those families
from among whom the rulers were elected. Through these elections,
as well as through the traditional need of the rulers to consult regularly with their councils and the people, a democratic element was
injected into the otherwise authoritarian form of government. As
we know from other sources, the Ashanti system, originally an efficient hierarchic military government, had degenerated so as to allow
wide opportunities of oppressive despotism and corruption. Thus, if
the British wished to use the native authorities, they had to reform
them. Transformation had to occur also for the reasons stated by
Harvey: occasional British misinformation about the state of native
affairs, the desire to have the positions of power occupied by people
loyal to the Crown, and, above all, the need for efficiency. In the
end, the Governor had the power to dominate the traditional native
administrations and to substitute for them native authorities of his
own creation. The result, as Harvey aptly states it, was the preponderance of the British District Commissioners over the native authorities. But the native authorities, although in many ways transformed, remained the governmental authority with which the
individual native had direct contact. By and large, the chieftainships
and the councils continued to be occupied by the members of the
old charismatic families rather than by that steadily growing group
of alumni of institutions of modern education.
With the coming of, first, national autonomy and, then, inde-
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pendence and one-party-rule, the fate of the traditional authorities
was sealed. A new, centralized network of administration was built
up, carefully organized so as to implement the policies of the
OsAgyefo. The ancient authorities were not completely abolished,
but they were deprived of their political powers and of their functions in the public administration. A comparison with the fate of
the European aristocracy might have been instructive: as the modem
state came to be established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Europe's nobility, too, was reduced from positions of political
rule to decorative functions and a declining status of social preeminence. The legal steps by which this result was achieved in Ghana
and by which the resistance of the traditionalist groups was broken
are traced by Harvey. Of decisive significance were those measures
by which the chiefs were deprived of their powers over the stool
lands, which resulted in the destruction not only of their economic
influence but also of their religious contact with the dwellings of
the ancestral spirits and, thus, meant the elimination of the magic
base of their traditional powers.
The elimination of the traditional authorities was both a requirement and a result of the option for political unity. Like Kenya,
Uganda, Nigeria, the Congo, and most others of the new African
states, Ghana harbors within its borders tribes and groups of ethnic,
linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. Under the British rule
much of this diversity had remained undisturbed. Upon independence, a choice had to be made between a system of decentralized
pluralism and one of centralization and unification that would tend
to reduce and ultimately eliminate the internal diversities. Harvey
calls the problem "a dominant factor in determining how the organized legal force would be used."
Under Nkrumah's leadership, the Congress People's Party passionately opted for nation-building through centralization. The
radicalism with which this aim was pursued was one of the principal
causes of resistance to Nkrumah's regime and of his ultimate downfall. Harvey describes the long series of British steps by which the
groundwork was laid not so much for unity of the Gold Coast as
for unity of such component parts as the Fanti Confederation of the
Ashanti. It was against the tendencies of regionalism which resulted
from these measures that Nkrumah had to push his drive for national unity and to suppress the opposing advocates of a federal structure. It would be interesting to know what position the new military
regime has taken on this touchy problem.
In presenting these momentous events, Harvey, as a lawyer,
emphasizes the legal measures in which they found expression. The
reproduction of the full text of the Republican Constitution of
1964, the White Paper by which it was proposed, and other funda-
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mental legislation is highly welcome. The book thus neatly illustrates
the legal steps by which the totalitarian dictatorship was established.
A comparison with the corresponding measures of Italian Fascism
and German National-Socialism might be tempting; also tempting
would be an analysis of the revolutionary forces which through these
legal measures sought to hasten the transformation of a traditionalist
African society into a Westernized and industrialized modern nation.
To lawyer-readers, the fourth chapter will be of special interest.
It deals with the legal profession. Its significance is indicated by the
opening sentence:
The hypothesis underlying this chapter is that adequate understanding of a legal system cannot result merely from the study of
the legal norms and the structure of courts. The study must
also include the professional group that holds itself out to the
public as advisers in matters of law and as representatives of litigants
in the courts. [P. 171.]
We might add that in the Ghanaian story the lawyer also appears in
the role of draftsman of the legislation by which the country was
prepared for independence by the British and by which the Osigyefo
attempted to achieve his political goals. As draftsmen, lawyers
moulded the underlying political thoughts into working tools. Who
were these lawyers? When independence came to the countries of
East Africa, there was hardly a handful of legally trained men. However, ambitious young men had gone from West Africa to England
for several generations, and many of them had gone through the
legal training required for admission to the English bar. In 1957,
the time of independence, quite a few Ghanaians were members of
the English bar. Some had taken law degrees at English universities;
more had, like many of their English brethren, obtained their legal
training as barristers' apprentices or in the law school of the Inns
of Court.
The change from an attempt at democracy to authoritarianism
was reflected in the enactments concerning the organization of the
bar, as it was reflected in all other fields of law in Ghana. In 1964,
the composition of the governing body of the bar, the Central Legal
Council, was so arranged as to shift preponderant influence from the
judiciary to the executive. Legal education was begun in Ghana itself in late 1958 with the opening of the Ghana Law School, which
was intended first to prepare students for the English bar examination, and later to provide short-time training for the lower ranks of
the judiciary; it was essentially a night school and had no connection
with the university. One of its aims was decidedly political: to train
lawyers imbued with the revolutionary spirit of the Congress People's
Party as a counterweight to the preponderance of lawyers who had
received conservative British training. In the political as well as in
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the conventional outlook of the new law school was to be found the
seed of conflict with the department of law that was intended to
be established as an academic institution at the university in Legon.
This conflict became apparent during the term of office of the first
head of the department, Mr. John H. A. Lang of England; it became
acute under the deanship of Mr. Harvey, who brought with him the
scholarly outlook of the leading institutions of American legal education. The story of the struggle about legal education would constitute a thrilling part of the legal development of Ghana. But having
been a principal protagonist, the author has imposed upon himself
the restraint he believes to be demanded of the scholar.
All of the new countries of Africa are faced with the problem of
duality in the administration of justice. The colonial powers introduced modem judicial systems patterned upon the court system of
the home country-England, France, or Belgium-and charged with
the application of a law that was substantially the same as that of the
home country. However, for the small affairs of the natives, indigenous courts were preserved or established which, under the control
of the administration and subject to the appellate jurisdiction of
western-style courts, were to apply the customary law of the native
communities. What the customary law was, could not, it is true,
always be ascertained with certainty even by the elders and much
less by the European or European-trained judges of the Western-style
courts acting on appeal. But in spite of manifold difficulties, the
native courts more or less conformed to the traditions of the African
communities that they served. The new African governments in
striving for uniformity are inclined to do away with the differences
between the laws of the several tribes, to integrate the native courts
into the general judicial structures of their countries, and to unify
their national legal systems through the general application of the
modern European laws as they had always been administered by
the Westem-style courts. Thus, under the guise of Africanization,
the law seems pretty generally to be de-Africanized.
The many changes that were made in the judicial system of
Ghana, first under the British administration, then by the Nkrumah
government of self-rule and later of complete independence, and,
finally, under the Republic Constitution of 1964, are reported in
detail. Unification of the court system was one of the earliest acts
of the autonomous government. The duality of the substantive law
was still preserved. However, the judges of the new local courts are
no longer local chiefs or other notables, but are appointees of the
central government, who can hardly be expected to be familiar with
the local customs. There also appears to be a tendency to redress
the attempts at strengthening judicial independence which had been
made during the late stage of British rule. The ultimate steps,
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the President's dismissal of the chief justice and the judges of the
Supreme Court when they acquitted a group of political opponents
and the creation of a constitutional basis for such presidential action
by express amendment to the Constitution, are described without
comment and with that detachment which is characteristic of the
book. Nevertheless, Harvey concludes his description with rare outspokenness:
The superior courts are generally regarded with respect. Below the
High Court level, however, the prestige of the courts rapidly dissipates. The most unsatisfactory situation exists in the local courts,
for here chiefs and other traditional officials, whose primary qualifications were familiarity with the customary laws, have now generally
been replaced by political appointees. The educational level of these
magistrates is so low that in-service programs are of questionable
value. Suspicions of bribery and corruption in the local courts seem
to be no less prevalent than they once were with respect to the old
Native Courts. The recent constitutional changes directly strike at
the confidence in the integrity and independence of the superior
courts. [Pp. 237-38.]
How laws were used to deliver the "Tools of Political Monopoly"
and how "Value Competition" has found expression in Ghanaian
legal development are demonstrated in the last two chapters of
Harvey's book. The story is carried to the end of 1964. No attempt
is made to show what happened under the present military regime.
The legal history of Ghana's formative period will be of interest to
students of law, of political science, and of African affairs. It has
been presented with remarkable objectivity by a competent and
sympathetic observer.
Max Rheinstein,
Professor of Law,
University of Chicago

INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS.

By Bernard F.

Cataldo, Cornelius W. Gillam, Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., John Al.
Stockton, and Charles M. Weber. New York: John Wiley &zSons.
1965. Pp. xiii, 880. $9.50.
The primary purpose of this book is to teach laymen the fundamentals of law. The authors apparently believe that law is too important to be left to lawyers alone, and that, as a result, the academic
community bears the responsibility of giving legal instruction to
laymen. The Ford Foundation has given financial support to this
endeavor to meet that responsibility.
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It is an implicit assumption of Introduction to Law that one need
not become a lawyer in order to achieve an adequate understanding
of how law works. The validity of this assumption is certainly open
to question. While there is probably little disagreement in either
the law schools or the academic community as a whole as to whether
an educated layman ought to understand the workings of law, it is
debatable whether an understanding of this kind can be instilled in
such a person outside the traditional framework of legal education.
Nevertheless, in the years to come, both law teachers and other educators have the opportunity to test the validity of the authors' assumption through classroom experimentation. Such actual experience might well provide an empirical basis for determining the
potentialities and the limitations of legal education for lawyers as
well as for laymen.
The authors' methodology is a radical departure from the casebook approach traditionally taken by the law schools. Instead of
requiring the student to analyze cases, memorize precedents, and
follow prescribed pathways in reasoning, the book leads him on a
fascinating descriptive tour of legal institutions and their historical
development. The tour begins with a presentation of the institutional, jurisprudential, and historical aspects of law and legal systems; in this connection there are chapters on "Nature, Meaning,
and Sources of Law," "Legal Reasoning, Growth of Law," "Federalism and the Legal System," "Puzzles in Pluralism," and "Judicial
Procedure." Next, the authors demonstrate the historical and social
impact of the law's response to economic and social problems
through an examination of the law of contract. The tour concludes
with a brief, nut-shell treatment of the law of agency and tort.
Lawyers who received their formal legal education through casebooks may frown on a descriptive, textbook presentation of law;
they may say that an approach of this kind is like fiddling without a
fiddle. Yet these same lawyers stoically accept the enormous consumption of classroom time and the key-hole perception of law
which are inherent in the casebook method. Introduction to Law
deserves a more open-minded reception.
The authors' pedagogical approach is suggested by the following
passage from their work:
Modern Developments
Conflict-of-laws rules are traditionally formal and exclusive in
character. The search is always for "the law of the place." The accompanying assumption is always that finding the law of the place
ends the matter. That law, and that law alone, controls. There is,
however, a marked trend away from that dogma. The new view is
variously called the contacts theory, the interests doctrine, the
center-of-gravity concept. It originated in contract cases, but has
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been extended to torts, and argues that a state other than the locus
may have a closer and more vital connection with a transaction and
the parties than does the locus. If so, the theory concludes, the local
law of that state should control, rather than the local law of the
locus. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Conflict of Laws
Restatement both adopt this view. The latter declares: "The local
law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort."
In a current case that illustrates the newer view, a motorist and
his guest, both New Yorkers, took a weekend trip to Canada. A collision in Ontario caused injury to the guest, who sued his host,
the driver, in New York. By statute in Ontario and several of our
states, but not in New York, a driver is immune to suit by his guest.
The court compared the relative contacts and interests of the forum
and of the locus and concluded "that the concern of New York is
unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of
Ontario is at best minimal." It decided that the Canadian statute
did not bar the present suit. One judge dissented and criticized the
court for "extending the principles of extraterritoriality as though
we were living in the days of the Roman or British Empire, when the
concepts were formed that the rights of a Roman or Englishman were
so significant that they must be enforced throughout the world even
where they were otherwise unlikely to be honored by 'lesser breeds
without the law.'"

The authors show judicious scholarship in their case analyses and
discussion, and carefully document their propositions of law with
appropriate citations. Case problems are included at the end of each
chapter as student exercises.
In the collaborative authorship of the book, each author prepared
certain chapters, and although the finished work shows remarkable
unity, it appears that the concepts may not be presented in a sequence appropriate for the building of a proper substructure of
student understanding. Viewed as a whole, however, it seems to this
reviewer that the authors have created a new and worthwhile instrument for teaching law to laymen, and that the impact of their
work on legal education-for prospective lawyers as well as for
laymen-will be of major proportions.
Joseph Lazar,
Associate Professor,
School of Business,
University of Colorado

